Domains and naïve theories by Gelman, Susan A. & Noles, Nicholaus S.
Overview
Domains and naı̈ve theories
Susan A. Gelman∗ and Nicholaus S. Noles
Human cognition entails domain-specific cognitive processes that influence
memory, attention, categorization, problem-solving, reasoning, and knowledge
organization. This article examines domain-specific causal theories, which are of
particular interest for permitting an examination of how knowledge structures
change over time. We first describe the properties of commonsense theories,
and how commonsense theories differ from scientific theories, illustrating with
children’s classification of biological and nonbiological kinds. We next consider
the implications of domain-specificity for broader issues regarding cognitive
development and conceptual change. We then examine the extent to which
domain-specific theories interact, and how people reconcile competing causal
frameworks. Future directions for research include examining how different
content domains interact, the nature of theory change, the role of context (including
culture, language, and social interaction) in inducing different frameworks, and
the neural bases for domain-specific reasoning.  2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. WIREs
Cogn Sci 2011 2 490–502 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.124
INTRODUCTION
Human cognition has classically been understoodin terms of domain-general processes such as
perception, attention, memory, categorization, logical
reasoning, and associative learning. These processes
apply broadly across knowledge domains, reflecting
psychological principles that transcend content. For
example, there is a domain-general constraint on
short-term memory such that when presented with
a new list of items, people can recall only 7 ± 2 pieces
of information, regardless of whether the items on the
list are numbers, chess pieces, or Pokémon characters.1
Discovering general principles of cognition is an
important goal of research.
Although domain-general processes are funda-
mental, they cannot provide a complete portrait of
human thought. Cognitive processes and their devel-
opmental paths are highly uneven across domains. For
example, consider the stark contrast between learning
language and learning calculus. Most children master
the principles of syntax within the first five years of life,
whereas vanishingly few children learn calculus dur-
ing that period. These different developmental paths
do not reflect a simple difference in the complexity
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or difficulty of syntax versus calculus, because syntax
is actually acquired more easily in childhood than
adulthood, whereas calculus shows the reverse (and
more typical) developmental pattern. More generally,
although many types of knowledge are acquired more
easily by adults than children (including higher math-
ematics, political and legal systems, medical treatment
of disease, or historical forces affecting social move-
ments), other types of knowledge are acquired more
easily in childhood than adulthood (such as syntax,
phonology, perhaps music), and even demonstrate
a sensitive period of learning in childhood.2 Thus,
the process of learning requires consideration of the
content of what is being learned.
IMPORTANCE OF DOMAIN-SPECIFIC
KNOWLEDGE
Domain-specific content knowledge influences a vast
scope of cognitive activities, including: what we attend
to (e.g., faces versus nonface displays),3 what we
remember (e.g., events that are congruent versus
incongruent with stereotypes),4 how we categorize
(e.g., animals versus human-made artifacts),5 what we
imitate,6 and future-based reasoning (e.g., predictions
regarding behavior of humans versus machines).7 For
example, although memory is constrained in domain-
general ways, domain-specific knowledge structures
influence how much gets chunked into a single unit,
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resulting in stunning variation in recall as a function
of expertise. Chess experts possess better recall for
chess pieces than do chess novices, but this advan-
tage is strongly attenuated if the pieces are in random
positions that do not naturally occur during chess
matches.8 An individual can even be trained to stretch
their digit span to as much as 10 times the average
span, simply by engaging in extensive practice with
chunking.9
Although the fact of domain-specificity is
uncontentious, how best to explain domain-specificity
incites more controversy. We illustrate with the case
of logical reasoning. For many years, researchers
assumed that logical reasoning rules (e.g., modus
ponens) are acquired as domain-general principles
in adulthood.10 However, performance on logical
reasoning tasks varies dramatically as a function
of how the problem is framed. When presented
in a context-free manner, adults consistently err in
applying certain logical principles.11 For example,
when asked to verify the rule ‘If a card has a vowel
on one side, it has an even number on the other side’
(logically represented as P → Q), people consistently
show a bias to check to see if cards with vowels
have even numbers (P; good), and if cards with even
numbers have vowels (Q; error, as they should check
to see if cards with odd numbers have vowels, in other
words, ∼Q). In contrast, when the logically identical
problem is framed in terms of rules for drinking (‘If a
person buys a beer, they are at least 18 years of age’),
people correctly check to see if people buying beer are
18 (P; good), and if people who are NOT 18 are buying
beer (∼Q; good) (see Figure 1). Some have proposed
that this domain-specific response arises out of
general principles involving familiarity and experience
(greater experience with certain kinds of rules leads
to better use of the logical principles),12 whereas
others have argued that it arises out of evolved social-
reasoning capacities to detect cheaters. Thus, even
with wholly novel content, if the problem is framed as
one in which there is a social contract, and individuals
are attempting to violate the rules of the social
contract, then correct performance is more likely.13
There are at least three distinct ways of
construing domain-specific cognition, each with
different assumptions regarding innateness, the role
of input, and outcome variability.14 These are
modularity, expertise, and theory perspectives (see

















(a)  Abstract problem (AP)
(b)  Drinking age problem (DAP; adapted from Griggs & Cox, 1982)
(If P then
"If a person has a 'D' rating, then his documents must be marked code '3',"
"If a person is drinking beer, then the must be over 20 years old."
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if any of these people are breaking this law.
∗The logical categories (Ps and Qs) marked on the rules and cards are here only for the reader's benefit; they never appear an problems given 
to subjects.
The cards below have information about four people sitting at a table in your bar. Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells 
what a person is drinking and the other side of the card tells that person's age.
In its crackdown against drunk drivers. Massachusetts law enforcement officials are revoking liquor licenses left and right. You are a 
bouncer in a Boston bar, and you'll lose your job unless you enforce the following law:
Part of your new clerical job at the local high school is to make sure that student documents have been processed correctly. Your job is to 
make sure the documents conform to the following alphanumeric rule:
Indicate only those card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the documents of any of these people violate this rule.
You suspect the secretary you replaced did not categorize the students' documents correctly. The cards below have information about the 
documents of four people who are enrolled at this high school. Each card represents one person. One side of a card tells a person's letter rating 
and the other side of the card tells that person's number code.
Q )∗
(If P then Q )
FIGURE 1 | Examples of content-specific effects on a logical reasoning task (the Wason selection task). Although the logical solution is the same
for both scenarios, differences in contextual framing yield different response patterns. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 13. Copyright 1989
Elsevier.)
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TABLE 1 Three Ways of Construing Domain-Specific Cognition (Reprinted with permission from Ref 14. Copyright 1998 Wiley-Blackwell)
A Schematic Comparison among Modular, Theory Theory, and Expertise Approaches
Mechanism Role of Input What is Innate Variability in Outcome Sample Domains






















Highly variable Reading, dinosaurs, physics
of the phenomena of interest, and all are critical to a
complete understanding of domain-specificity.
The modularity perspective posits that evolu-
tionary pressures have gradually resulted in brain
regions functionally dedicated to certain biologically
constrained processes. For example, studies of face
perception have revealed that the processes by which
faces are perceived and recognized are localized to
specific portions of the brain referred to collectively
as the fusiform face area (FFA).15 Other examples of
modularity include concepts of number16 and certain
aspects of language acquisition (notably phonology
and syntax).17 These proposed specialized neurologi-
cal structures provide innate, domain-specific process-
ing that emerges with little experience and develops
according to a highly constrained and predictable
developmental pattern.18 At the same time, however,
it is important to note that functional localization per
se is neither necessary nor sufficient for modularity.
Although the modularity perspective posits uni-
versal, neurologically localized, and innate systems,
the expertise perspective posits that extensive experi-
ence can lead to qualitative changes in cognitive skills
(see the work of Ericsson19 for a review). The first
time a teenager drives a car, he/she must explicitly
monitor his/her environment, think about how hard
he/she is pushing the pedals or turning the wheel,
and remember the rules of the road and the path to
his/her destination. After years of experience, drivers
perform these tasks with very little explicit thought or
attention. A similar process occurs for new readers.
At first, they identify individual letters and say them
aloud, but soon they are experiencing text in a much
different way, absorbing whole words and sentences
faster than they can speak. Learning to drive or to
read fundamentally changes the way that individu-
als experience these domains. However, expertise in
one area does not readily cross domain boundaries.
Being a skilled driver does not positively or negatively
influence reading comprehension, for example.
Finally, the theory perspective involves both
early emerging and experience-based components.
Initially, children rely on relatively sparse theories
relating to ontologies and other domain-specific prin-
ciples (e.g., theory of mind or theory of physical
objects). However, as they collect evidence through
everyday experiences with the world, as well as inter-
actions with others in social contexts, children amend
and expand their intuitions into more complex and
comprehensive causal-explanatory understandings.20
For example, children’s concept of support—that one
object holds up another—is very coarse early in devel-
opment, but as they gain experience their theories
adapt to account for the permutations in the nature
of contact and weight distribution.21
In this article, we focus primarily on domain-
specific causal theories, which are of particular
interest for permitting an examination of how
knowledge structures change over time. We first
describe the properties of commonsense theories,
and how commonsense theories differ from scientific
theories, illustrating with an examination of children’s
intuitive classification of living things. We next
consider the implications of domain-specificity for
broader issues regarding cognitive development and
conceptual change. We then examine the extent to
which domain-specific theories interact (or not), and
how children reconcile competing causal frameworks.
Finally, we summarize and conclude.
COMMONSENSE THEORIES
In this section, we review the components of
commonsense theories (also known as folk or naı̈ve
theories), clarify the distinction between commonsense
theories and scientific theories, and provide examples
of how commonsense theories are instantiated in
human classifications from an early age.
Components of a commonsense theory. Carey22
noted that commonsense theories have three key com-
ponents (Table 2): ontological commitments, causal
laws, and coherence. Ontological commitments spec-
ify what sorts of entities participate in a theory; for
example, mental states in a theory of psychology or
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TABLE 2 Components of a Commonsense Theory, with Examples (Reprinted with permission from Ref 22. Copyright 1985 Wiley-Blackwell)
Biology Physics Psychology
Ontological commitments Animals, parents Physical objects Thoughts, desires
Causal laws Eating food causes animals to
grow
One object colliding with another
object causes it to move
Beliefs and desires cause
individuals to act
Coherence Living and dying are reciprocal
processes. If something can
live, then it can die
Unsupported objects fall from up to
down, but supported objects are
solid and stable
Acts are intentional when people
are awake and accidental when
they are asleep
Unobservables Essence Gravity Goals
elements in a theory of chemistry. The very same object
can be construed from multiple ontological perspec-
tives: in a psychological theory, a dog is understood
in terms of its thoughts, motives, and personality; in
a biological theory, a dog is understood in terms of
its multiple bodily systems (digestive, circulatory) and
evolutionary past; in a physical theory, a dog is under-
stood in terms of its weight, mass, and momentum.
Similarly, a $20 bill is a flammable piece of paper in
a physical theory, but a unit of exchange in an eco-
nomic theory. So, ontological commitments provide
the broad perspective and elements that one considers
in thinking about an entity. Children are sensitive to
ontological distinctions from infancy, expecting, for
example, that the conditions leading to object motion
will differ for people versus inanimate objects.23
Causal laws form the framework for the knowl-
edge structures that each theory contains. In a psycho-
logical theory, thoughts and beliefs are the underlying
motivations to a person’s behavior. In a biological
theory, ingestion of food leads to an increase in body
weight. In a physical theory, energy is transferred
from one ball to another when two balls collide. One
key difference between a theory and other kinds of
knowledge structures (such as taxonomies or scripts)
is that theories require causal understandings. Thus,
one could possess a script for what one does at a birth-
day party that involves a detailed set of rules regarding
what happens when, but a script need not include any
information about how these features are causally
linked. In forming causal laws and expectations, chil-
dren and adults are particularly sensitive to statistical
patterns of cooccurrence and make use of these cues
to draw rich causal inferences. For example, Kushnir
and Gopnik24 presented children with a machine that
lights up and plays sounds when certain objects are
placed on top of it. Children were exquisitely sensitive
to the regularity with which blocks caused the box
to light up and make sounds, exhibiting the ability to
consistently select the block that ‘made the box go’
at higher rates (see Figure 2). At the same time, chil-
dren’s judgments were also influenced by whether the
person acting upon the object was the child him/herself
or another person. Actions performed by the self
were given more weight, reflecting intuitive theoretical









































FIGURE 2 | Summary of experimental trials examining children’s
sensitivity to statistical information in forming causal expectations. In
3/3 trials, children learned that Block A reliably set off the detector and
they selected that block as the cause at rates significantly greater than
chance. Children were sensitive to the probability that each block would
activate the detector, but their selections were also influenced by their
own actions. As can be seen in the 2/3 trials, children employed
statistical regularities when they observed the experimenter activating
the detector, but when their own experience activating the detector
was at odds with the overall statistical regularity of the entire trial, they
relied on their own personal action on the detector rather than
statistical regularities alone. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 24.
Copyright 2005 SAGE Publications.)
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Beyond simply identifying cause and effect rela-
tionships, children and adults treat causal features as
more central than other (noncausal) features. This pri-
oritization of causes is referred to as the ‘causal status
hypothesis’.25 For example, if eating fruit causes an
animal called a rooban to have sticky feet that enable
them to climb trees, then eating fruit is a central feature
of the rooban because the remaining features of the
rooban are effects of their diet. Consequently, a crea-
ture that eats fruit but does not climb trees (thereby
retaining the causal feature) is more likely to be iden-
tified as a rooban than a creature that eats meat and
climbs trees (thereby retaining the effect feature; see
Table 3 for examples in other domains). Children and
adults attend to causal features in both knowledge-
rich domains and simplified domains about which
participants have minimal knowledge.26,27
Coherence indicates that various beliefs are
interrelated, and not simply isolated propositions.
To these three components, we would also add that
theories include unobservable constructs. Gravity is
unobservable, but even infants have some sense that
an unseen force acts on objects: unsupported objects
are expected to fall to the ground; they do not
hang suspended in the air. Children appeal to this
unobservable construct even before they have a full
understanding of the rules of support (see Figure 3 for
how this understanding changes with age).21 Further-
more, unobserved features are not limited to physical
theories, but extend to include postulated entities, such
as thoughts and desires (in a psychological theory)28
and essences (in a biological theory).29
Commonsense theories versus scientific theories.
Commonsense theories, though importantly similar
to scientific theories, differ from scientific theories
in several key respects. First, commonsense theories
are formulated at an abstract, global level. Wellman28
makes a distinction between a framework theory and a
specific theory. He gives the example of behaviorism as
a framework theory within the domain of psychology,
and the Rescorla–Wagner theory of classical
conditioning as a specific theory within the framework
theory of behaviorism. Whereas specific theories are
directly tested and modified via experimental evidence,
framework theories embody a set of theoretical
assumptions that are not as easily changed on the
basis of empirical evidence. Commonsense theories
are akin to framework theories, not specific theories.
Second, commonsense theories are rarely tested
rigorously. A scientist formulates precise and explicitly
formulated hypotheses, designs experiments that sys-
tematically modify the variables under study, and pre-
cisely evaluates the evidence to determine the empirical
support for the theory. A layperson rarely engages in
these processes, instead generating hypotheses that
are less formal, and evaluating evidence in a more
piecemeal manner. Indeed, one very important devel-
opmental change is the ability to test and evaluate
TABLE 3 Example Domains and Features (Reprinted with permission from Ref 25. Copyright 2000 Elsevier)
Types of Features
Domains X Y Z Causal Background Information
Animal (roobans) Eat fruits Have sticky feet Build nests on
trees
Eating fruits tends to cause roobans to have sticky feet because
sugar in fruits is secreted through pores under their feet. Having
sticky feet tends to allow roobans to build nests on trees
because they can climb up the trees easily with sticky feet
Disease (Covition) Blurred
vision
Headache Insomnia Blurred vision tends to cause Covition patients to have a headache.
A headache tends to cause Covition patients to suffer from
insomnia
Tribe (Hino) Farming Many leaders Monotheistic Relying on farming tends to cause Hino tribes to have many leaders
because large-scale farming requires specialized decisions that
must be co-ordinated by many leaders. Having many leaders, in
turn, tends to cause Hino tribes to be monotheistic because
unity under a single deity prevents squabbling and fighting for









Butane-laden fuel in a Romanian Rogo tends to cause hot engine
temperatures. The butane in the fuel burns at a hotter
temperature than normal gasoline. Hot engine temperatures in
a Romanian Rogo tends to cause a gas gasket to become loose.
The heat in the engine makes the rubber around the gas gasket
melt and become loose
Causal features (in the X column) are more useful in making inductive inferences than features that are effects.
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Shape of the box
FIGURE 3 | The development of infant knowledge about support
during their first year as reported by Baillargeon.21 (Reprinted with
permission from Ref 21. Copyright 1998 The International Union of
Psychological Science.)
theories in a methodical, scientific manner (Figure 4).
This is not to say that children ignore empirical evi-
dence; to the contrary, consideration of evidence is key
to all theories, scientific or commonsense.20 Rather,
children consider and evaluate data in a qualitatively
different manner than scientists.
Finally (and most obviously), while scientific
theories are (by definition) created by adult scientists,
commonsense theories require no specialized knowl-
edge and are constructed (or begin to be constructed)
early in childhood. Consequently, it is likely that the
sociological context of theory construction is quite
different for scientific theories (involving collabora-
tions within and across research teams systematically
formulating and testing explicit hypotheses) than for
a child attempting to understand the world with input
from multiple, often implicit sources (parent, school,
peers, informal observations).31 (In the section enti-
tled ‘Interactions Among Domains’, we address the
additional question of whether scientists also retain
their commonsense theories, alongside the scientific
theories they have constructed.)
Which theories and how many theories children
possess at different ages are open questions, although
most researchers would credit children with at least
a naı̈ve physics and a naı̈ve psychology from infancy,
and some would also credit children with a naı̈ve
biology from an early age.14,32
Evidence for commonsense theories: Biological
classification as a case study. There is a rich array of
research findings demonstrating that domain-specific
commonsense theories affect cognition from early in
life. We illustrate by considering the classification
of animals within a naı̈ve biological theory. The
ontological commitments of a naı̈ve biology include
a distinction between living and nonliving things,
and between plants and animals, as well as an
assumption that there are distinctly different kinds
of animals (e.g., birds, fish, dogs, and llamas are all
qualitatively different kinds).33 The causal processes
that are key to a naı̈ve biology entail inherent, self-
directed change not reducible either to intentional
action (which is psychological) or mechanical action
(which is physical). These processes would include, for
example, growth, healing, and processing nutrients.
The coherence evident in a naı̈ve biology tells us, for
example, that life and death are reciprocal processes,
or that elements that lead to illness must be reversed
to yield a cure. Finally, unobservable constructs in a
naı̈ve biology might include the notion of a category
essence,29 vitalism,32 or genes.
The importance of domain-specific theories can
be seen in children’s categorization of the biological
world, and how it differs from their categorization in
other domains. As Stephen Jay Gould wrote, p. 98,
‘Classifications are theories about the basis of natu-
ral order, not dull catalogues compiled only to avoid
chaos’.34 When categorizing, children view distinc-
tions between different animal species as natural and
objective, whereas they view distinctions between dif-
ferent artifact species as conventional and subjective.35
This distinction has numerous consequences for chil-
dren’s behavior and choices. For categories of ani-
mals, children recognize that appearances can be
deceiving.36 At the same time, children understand
that category membership is unchanging in the face of
purely superficial transformations (e.g., a lion wearing
a tiger costume is still a lion), and yet for artifacts,
superficial changes often can and do change the iden-
tity of an object (e.g., a coffeepot with an opening cut
out becomes a birdfeeder).37 Children are also more
likely to view membership in a category as absolute
for animals but ‘‘graded’’ for artifacts.38 For example,
they recognize that an ostrich is an atypical bird, yet
they deny that it is ‘‘sort of’’ a bird, insisting that
it is fully, 100% a bird. In contrast, they recognize
that a headband is an atypical piece of clothing and
further judge it to be ‘‘sort of’’ a piece of cloth-
ing (not fully, not 100% clothing). They object to
the possibility of grouping together members of two












































FIGURE 4 | Kuhn’s30 theory of intellectual competence includes influences of both meta-cognition and dispositional factors. The interaction of
these factors results in theory creation and evaluation. (Reprinted with permission from Ref 30. Copyright 2001 Wiley-Blackwell.)
distinct animal categories (e.g., dog and cat) but hap-
pily accept grouping together members of two distinct
artifact categories (e.g., bookcase and table).35
Children are also more likely to generalize
properties of an individual to members of the broader
category for animals than for artifacts, suggesting that
animal categories capture a greater wealth of deep,
nonobvious commonalities than artifact categories.39
Altogether, for young children as well as adults,
the process of categorization involves distinct kinds
of information, structure, and inferences depending
on the domain (animal versus artifact).40,41 Sloman
et al.42 provide a thoughtful discussion of different
theoretical accounts of domain-specific categorization.
IMPLICATIONS FOR COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT
Domain-specific theories challenge the conventional
wisdom that development proceeds along a series of
discrete stages reflecting broad, overarching changes
in the structure of thought.10 Stage theorists posit
maturational limits on the capacities of children as
a function of age. On this view, a 12-year-old is a
fundamentally different kind of learner and thinker
than a 7-year-old, who in turn is a fundamentally
different kind of learner and thinker than a 4-year-
old (and so on)—regardless of the content of the
information being considered. In contrast, the past
40 years of research documents that learning and
cognitive performances are uneven across domains
within an age. More generally, it is misleading to
characterize young children as qualitatively distinct
reasoners from adults. Children are not uniformly con-
crete thinkers, solely focused on surface appearances,
incapable of considering subtle or nonobvious fea-
tures. Preschool children can distinguish appearance
from reality,43 reason about abstract categories,29
and consider nonobvious entities such as germs or
invisible forces.44,45 Children often default to consid-
ering outward appearances in the absence of relevant
domain-specific information, but they are not limited
to such cues.
Another central debate in the area of cogni-
tive development concerns how best to characterize
conceptual change. We know that concepts undergo
changes with age, but what is the nature of such
change? Do children simply accrue greater amounts
of knowledge over time (the continuity view), or do
children’s concepts undergo fundamental restructur-
ing or reorganization, leading to wholly new concepts
that are incommensurate with old concepts (the dis-
continuity view)? Carey22 has provided compelling
evidence for theory change in childhood akin to the-
ory change in science, arguing, p. 1846: ‘human beings,
alone among animals, have the capacity to create
representational systems that transcend sensory rep-
resentations and core cognition. . . [they] create new
representational resources that are qualitatively dif-
ferent from the representations they are built from’.
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There is evidence for qualitative conceptual change
in domains as wide-ranging as number, object kinds,
social kinds, matter/substance, and heat/temperature.
For example, Carey46 presents extensive evidence that
although infants have an innate capacity to repre-
sent quantities (a) parallel individuation system that
represents individuals and so permits solving simple
addition and subtraction problems,47 they do not yet
have the capacity to represent positive integers, and
this ability takes years to develop.
A theory perspective on cognition also empha-
sizes the role of input to developing theories. There
are several types of input leading to children’s theory
enrichment and theory change. One important sort of
input is children’s direct observations of the environ-
ment (e.g., observing different kinds of faces influences
the nature of perceptual face categories)48 as well as
their own manipulations on the environment (e.g., the
opportunity to pick up objects influences an infant’s
understanding of intentional action).49 Input to chil-
dren’s developing theories also includes the language
and social guidance of others.50,51 Indeed, humans
may be uniquely prepared to consider and respond to
the pedagogical cues of conspecific others.52 Notably,
children do not simply or passively absorb infor-
mation from others, but rather interpret and assess
informational cues.53 For example, they consider the
trustworthiness and knowledgeability of the source,
in judging whom to believe.
Furthermore, theory change entails correcting
misconceptions—which can be persistent—and thus
children cannot just simply add on correct information
as presented by others. For example, when learning
about the shape of the earth, elementary-school
children first have to learn that their a priori
assumptions (e.g., that earth is a hollowed-out sphere
with people living on the inside) are erroneous.54
The naı̈ve theory perspective also emphasizes
the importance of explanation as a critical pro-
cess in children’s reasoning. Explanation is verbally
demanding, and children often display much more
sensitive understanding when nonverbal methods are
used (e.g., simple choice tasks; habituation; eye-
tracking). Nonetheless, despite the linguistic and cog-
nitive demands of constructing explanations, recent
evidence suggests that explanations may at times pro-
mote a more accurate and considered understanding
of the task at hand, at least on an explicit level.
For example, when asked to reason about theory
of mind, children provide a deeper understanding of
false beliefs when asked to explain a character’s action
(‘Why did Jimmy look under the couch when his cat
is actually behind the chair?’) than when asked to pre-
dict a character’s action (‘Where will Jimmy look for
his cat?’).55 Likewise, children provide a more accu-
rate understanding of contamination when asked to
explain a character’s action (‘Why did Sally drink the
water instead of the lemonade with a leaf in it?’) than
when asked to predict a character’s action (‘What
will Sally drink: the water or the lemonade with a
leaf in it?’).56 Interestingly, when providing explana-
tions, they spontaneously refer to invisible elements
that were never mentioned in the story (e.g., germs
or contamination, see Table 4). It is counter-intuitive
that explanations can be more sensitive routes to
children’s understanding than predictions, but expla-
nation assumes a particular outcome, and is thus more
constrained than prediction. An intriguing possibility
is that the act of generating an explanation may itself
promote better causal understanding.57 Wellman and
TABLE 4 Examples of Children’s Explanations of Disease Transmission (Reprinted with permission from Ref 17. Copyright 2004 Willey-Blackwell)
Germs-transmission Disgust-transmission Contaminating Substance Transfer Dirt or Dirty Substance Transfer
‘Because this one has the germs
from the dog on it. Dog took a
lick, they spread germs on each
other and the boy gets sick’
‘If she eats it then there’s mud,
because the chocolate chip
cookie fell in the mud, there
would be mud in her mouth,
since there’s also bugs in
mud, that’s gross’
‘Maybe the grasshopper has a
color on its skin that got in the
pop and made it poisonous.
Maybe the grasshopper hopped
in and left green stuff’
‘It fell in the dirt, there’s
little animals in there;
little animals climb in
there’
‘Because the dirt is dirty and she
doesn’t want to get sick. Dirt
has yucky germs on it and that’s
where the worms are’
‘Cause there’s doggy lick in
there; because it would taste
gross’
‘Cause he knew the grasshopper
jumped in and jumped out.
‘Cause it doesn’t taste good;
that kind of grasshopper flavor
doesn’t taste good’
‘Because the leaf came in
and fogged the milk and
got it all dirty. It just dirty
cause the leaf came in’
‘Because he doesn’t want to get
dog germs, they will make him
definitely sick. Dogs have dirty
tongues like worms’
‘Because of the leaf, cause they
are yucky for you. You get
icky stuff in your tummy’
‘He wanted the grape because he
wouldn’t want doggy slime in
his mouth. He would have to go
to the doctor’
‘Because the chocolate milk
was dirty cause the leaf
fell in, the leaf can crack
and a piece can fall off’
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Liu58 refer to this process as ‘post-diction’. More
research is needed to uncover the mechanisms by
which post-diction differs from verbally stated pre-
dictions, and how both of these processes differ from
implicit predictions of the sort made in infancy.59
INTERACTIONS AMONG DOMAINS
The organization of knowledge into domains raises
the question of how domains interact. To what extent
do children rely on domain boundaries in their reason-
ing? To what extent do distinct explanatory models
compete versus coexist? This problem is particularly
acute when one considers that real-world phenom-
ena are more complex than a strict division into
domains might suggest. Although we tend to pre-
fer single explanations,60 a given phenomenon may
call to mind multiple possible accounts. For example,
an individual’s serious illness may be understood in
terms of frameworks that are biological (infection),
psychological (stress), political (environmental toxins
found in poor neighborhoods), sociological (effects
of institutional racism or sexism on one’s immune
system), supernatural (witchcraft or prayer), moral
(divine retribution), statistical (bad luck), etc.
On the one hand, children honor strict onto-
logical boundaries from an early age (e.g., biological
versus psychological).32,37 Notably, children not only
accurately represent domain distinctions that are a
realistic reflection of regularities found in the world,
but also overextend the importance of ontological
boundaries, erroneously rejecting real-life phenomena
that cross domain boundaries. For example, adults
and children alike have difficulty appreciating psy-
chogenic illnesses61: children under age 10 deny, for
example, that a mental state can have physical effects
(e.g., that worry can lead to a stomach-ache), whereas
adults accept psychogenic illnesses but treat them as
not ‘real’ (e.g., medicine cannot cure bodily disorders,
if they are caused by a mental state). These beliefs are
resistant to informational input, but also modified by
such input. When provided with statistical evidence
that runs counter to this theoretical assumption, chil-
dren as young as 3.5 years of age can learn that a
psychological cause had physical effects.62,63
On the other hand, children also at times make
the opposite error of inappropriately assuming that
one domain intrudes upon another. For example,
when making predictions about how objects behave
in accordance with physical laws (e.g., the path that
an object will fall out of an airplane, the trajectory
of an object launched off a slide, or the weight of
an object on the moon), 5- and 7-year-old children
inappropriately take into account the animacy of
the physical object—for example, they generalized
a physical fact about a rock more often to another
inanimate object than to a person, and vice versa.64
A second example of inappropriate intrusion of one
domain onto reasoning about another comes from
children’s judgments about ownership. When deciding
who can be an owner, children inappropriately take
into account a person’s psychological state.65 For
example, adults attribute ownership to individuals
who are awake or asleep, but children, despite
understanding the nature of sleep as a mental state
quite well, only attribute ownership to people who
are awake. Children and adults attribute the same
physical and mental abilities and limitations to
sleeping people, but these limitations interfere with
ownership attributions made by children. Altogether,
these disparate pieces of evidence suggest that there
is not a single approach to reasoning about relations
among domains, and that children are relatively open-
minded in this regard.
Another key question is whether learning a new
theory results in the new theory supplanting the old,
such that the old theory disappears, or whether instead
the new theory coexists alongside the old theory.
Increasing evidence suggests that the latter possibility
holds true. One widespread example is that acquiring
scientific theories to explain phenomena such as illness
or species origins does not eradicate supernatural or
religious theories for the same phenomena. Subbotsky,
pp. 327–328, explains this perspective as follows:
‘. . . a contemporary Western individual is not an
exclusively rational being and . . . he or she, living in
the world created by science, dwells in the worlds
of dreams, art, fantasies, play, and social myths.
This means that if the individual is to encounter
a certain phenomenon with no established scientific
explanation, he or she may be prepared to explain the
phenomenon in a number of ways, only some of which
are compatible with the vision of modern science’.66
Dunbar et al.67 similarly note that, p. 202, ‘even
when conceptual change appears to have taken
place, students still have access to the old naı̈ve
theories and. . . these theories appear to be actively
inhibited rather than reorganized and absorbed into
the new theory’. Dunbar and colleagues conducted
a study with undergraduates, using fMRI measures
to examine their theories of physical motion. Prior
research has uncovered a well-documented tendency
for people to maintain a medieval ‘Impetus’ theory
of motion (e.g., larger object falls faster than smaller
object), and to require extensive schooling to shift
to a more accurate ‘Newtonian’ theory of motion
(e.g., larger and smaller objects fall at the same rate).68
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In Dunbar et al.’s67 study, participants were asked to
predict kinds of motion, and also were scanned while
viewing videos consistent with either the Impetus
theory or the Newtonian theory. Overall, amount
of physics experience predicted both participants’
predictions and their brain responses. Participants
showed increased patterns of activation in the
anterior cingulate when viewing the motion pattern
inconsistent with their naı̈ve theory (e.g., nonphysics
students predicted that larger objects would fall
faster, and showed an error detection brain pattern
when larger and smaller objects fell at the same
rate; physics students predicted that objects would
fall at the same rate, and showed an error
detection brain pattern when they did not). But of
particular interest in the present context, a subset
of the participants who gave the correct prediction
nonetheless showed increased activation of the
anterior cingulate when viewing this pattern. Dunbar
et al. suggest that these participants have learned
the correct response without understanding why or
undergoing the deep conceptual change required for
theory revision—thereby maintaining the old, intuitive
theory while accepting the new, more scientific theory.
Another example of coexistence of biological
and supernatural explanatory systems is found in ill-
ness concepts, where the desire to find an explanatory
account is high, and especially when multiple explana-
tory models are available in the input. For example,
children and adults in Sesotho-speaking communi-
ties in South Africa, where HIV infection rates are
very high, maintain both biological and supernatural
(witchcraft) explanatory systems.69 In a study exam-
ining illness beliefs in this population, over half the
participants provided both biological and supernat-
ural explanations at least once. Furthermore, one of
the communities in this study was less rural and had
higher levels of biological knowledge, but this did
not relate inversely to frequency of witchcraft expla-
nations. Thus, endorsement of witchcraft does not
reflect an absence of accurate biological explanations.
Instead, witchcraft beliefs persisted even when partici-
pants had ample knowledge of the biological processes
involved in illness transmission.
Legare and Gelman69 proposed that there are
at least three possibilities for how natural and
supernatural explanatory frameworks may coexist
with one another: (1) they may remain distinct
frameworks recruited to explain distinct phenomena
(e.g., natural explanations to explain colds; super-
natural explanations to explain AIDS), (2) they may
be used jointly to explain the same phenomena, but
loosely (without considering how they interact), or
(3) they may combine more precisely (e.g., treating
natural causes as proximate but supernatural causes
as distal). The evidence best supports the second and
third options—that is, that natural and supernatu-
ral beliefs are often recruited to explain the same
event. Adults’ justifications yielded support for both
‘loose’ coexistence (supplying both kinds of explana-
tions without trying to integrate them; for example,
explaining an illness event by saying, ‘adultery
and witchcraft’) and more precise coexistence (e.g.,
explaining an illness event by saying, ‘Witchcraft can
fool you into sleeping with an HIV-infected person’
or ‘A witch can make a condom weak, and break’).
A further point regarding the coexistence of
multiple explanatory systems is that context is critical
in determining how an individual (child or adult)
understands a phenomenon and which causal theory
they invoke. This has been found for explanations
for illness,69,70 explanations for death,71 judgments
about category membership,72 and judgments about
magical or fantasy events.73 In all of these cases, we see
markedly different responses as a function of context.
These results suggest that coherence in theories may be
difficult to achieve across learning contexts. For other
investigations of coexistence of multiple explanatory
frameworks, see Refs 74 and 75.
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed evidence demonstrating that
domain-specific reasoning has abundant effects on
human thought, from infancy through adulthood.
Domain-specificity can result from any of multiple
sources, including innate biases, extensive experience,
and expertise, and the construction of intuitive causal
theories. We focused on causal theories, as these have
implications for cognitive development and concep-
tual change.
Although we have presented evidence consistent
with the view that children construct domain-specific
theories, not everyone subscribes to the theory the-
ory perspective. For example, considering ‘theory of
mind’, some researchers ascribe more innate compe-
tence to infants and suggest that apparent instances
of theory change instead reflect changes in executive
function.76 In the causal reasoning and categorization
literature, some researchers subscribe to the view that
children’s learning is fragile, context dependent, and
driven by associative learning of primarily salient, sur-
face properties.77–79 A different perspective, supported
by promising new statistical approaches to rational
inference, suggests the possibility of drawing rich
abstract inferences from sparse data, consistent with
the theory theory approach. Furthermore, even those
who endorse the theory theory do not suggest that
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domain-general cognitive processes are unimportant.
Attentional biases, similarity judgments, and associa-
tive learning all play important roles in many aspects
of cognition and cognitive development. Debates con-
cerning precisely what this role is continue to generate
novel experimental tests and insights.
Another open question concerns what consti-
tutes a domain, from a psychological perspective.
Although it can be convenient to think of domains in
terms of disciplines in a university (e.g., physics, psy-
chology, biology), it may turn out that certain domain
distinctions are more subtle or fine-grained than pre-
viously understood. For example, New et al.80 find
that spatial reasoning is not a single, undifferentiated
domain, but rather consists of more specific tasks that
have different functional implications during key peri-
ods of human evolutionary history. Thus, although
some studies have found that men perform better
on spatial reasoning tasks than women, these effects
reverse when the task involves gathering high-calorie
foods in a context with landmarks (e.g., recalling
the order and location of avocado and honey in
an outdoor farmer’s market). Furthermore, domain-
specificity may be fruitfully extended to other areas
of psychological functioning, beyond knowledge rep-
resentations. For example, the kinds of interpersonal
social interactions, including parent-child interactions,
may be understood in a domain-specific framework.81
The available evidence points to several direc-
tions for future research. One important direction
is to make use of new methods and approaches to
broaden the empirical basis for studying domain-
specificity. One such approach is to make judicious
use of neuroimaging and brain localization data to
obtain converging evidence for the underlying pro-
cesses that distinguish between domains. Exciting
studies examining these issues when studying theory of
mind suggest important conclusions regarding the pro-
cesses involved.82 Another approach is to make use of
evidence from different cultural groups to disentangle
effects of experience on domain-specific learning.83,84
Another future research direction is to try
to understand the developmental underpinnings of
domain-specificity, and in particular, the extent to
which the divisions into domains are innately given
versus constructed in development. A challenge in this
area is to determine a nonverbal equivalent to theories
in infancy (see the work of Onishi and Baillargeon85
for an excellent example of theory of mind reasoning
in preverbal infancy). Relatedly, an important issue
is that of understanding how innate (or early) biases
interact with statistical learning to yield theory growth
and change.86 These questions hold great promise for
addressing some of the key foundational issues in
psychology.
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